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Abstract
In the direct communication quantum channels the authorized recipi-
ent (Bob) and the non-authorized recipient (Eve) have different abilities
for verification of received information. Bob can apply the feedback to
commit the sender (Alice) to perform verification. Eve has to use for
verification an indirect method based on the measurement of a set of in-
compatible observables enough for determination of the coding basis used
by Alice.
In the protocol of direct communication regular modification of coding
basis and masking it with an equilibrium in average information carrier
density matrix prevents reconstruction of coding basis by the results of
Eve’s measurements of an arbitrary set of observables. This provides
unconditional security of the channel.
1 Introduction
In direct communication quantum channels security is provided with impossi-
bility of copying information without change of state of the information carrier.
The protocols with quantum key distribution and following information
transfer by public classical channels make it possible to use the well-known
theorems [1, 2] of the information theory at analysis of data security, at that
the quantum properties are used only for the problem of key distribution that
has no reliable solution in the case of application of other methods. This pos-
sibility is a forcible argument for information security specialists. Along with
that, for the users that have no special knowledge in theory of information se-
curity it is much easier to accept the fact of data security at data transfer in a
channel that makes copying impossible at all than to believe in impossibility of
extraction of encoded information without the key. This makes the problem on
existence of absolutely protected direct communication quantum channels to be
of especial interest.
In the theory of secure communication three parties are usually considered
as participants of information transfer: Alice sends information, Bob is the
authorized recipient of information, Eve makes attempts to copy information
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insensibly for Alice and Bob. Difference in the problems solved by Eve and Bob
is based on the fact that Alice intends to facilitate receiving information by Bob
and to prevent its copying by Eve.
Success in use of quantum information carriers for for secure data transfer
is based on three factors.
The first factor is the well-known, though not directly appealed to presence
of free choice at quantum measurements: one party of the measurement, Alice,
prepares the quantum state at her choice (in the QKD protocols this is random
choice), the second party, either Bob, or Eve, applies one of incompatible mea-
suring devices at his/her choice (in the QKD protocols this choice is random
as well). If Alice and Bob co-ordinate their choices, it is possible to provide
for Bob correct identification of the states prepared by Alice. Along with that,
Eve can not co-ordinate her measuring devices with Alice ans registers states
differing from the states prepared by Alice in random way.
The second factor is well-known as well, though in mathematical statistics
only, while quantum physics gives not enough attention to it: measurement of
a random value requires a number of repetitions of measurements, this num-
ber increases at increase of required accuracy of measurement. Repetition of
measurement involves purposeful activity of two parties of the process of mea-
surement. Alice and Bob co-ordinate their efforts for coordination of Bob’s
detector settings with the settings of Alic’s sources. Eve’s measurements are
not supported by Alice.
The third factor is well-known in quantum physics: the state of a quantum
system can be determined by the results of measurement of a number, minimum
three incompatible observables [3]. If Eve does not know beforehand measure-
ment of which one of observables represents information sent by Alice, she has
to measure repetitively different incompatible observables, at that the results
of Eve’s measurements are random and do not represent information sent by
Alice. If Alice and Bob routinely and in coordination change the coding set of
quantum states, for Eve it is impossible to perform measurements with enough
accuracy, and she can not calculate the coding set. Besides that, Eve has no rea-
sons to consider the results of her measurements as corresponding to transferred
information irrespectively of the device by which those are obtained.
Hereinafter one of possible protocols of direct communication with Qubit as
information carrier is described. This protocol provides impossibility of eaves-
dropping by means of feedback (coordination of choices) and routine change of
the coding pair of states. The point of the Poincare sphere representing the
coding state performs random walk without return.
Below peculiarities of the processes providing collection of statistics of mea-
surements are considered. Special attention is focused on differences of the Bob’s
and Eve’s problems.
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2 Description of the protocol
In the proposed protocol with feedback the parties use for communication two
same channels, one in each direction. Information carriers in channels are in
quantum states that belong to a two-dimensional Hilbert space, i.e. those are
Qubits. The party that is the source of the message is named Alice, the other
party is named Bob.
2.1 States and detectors
Alice codes information by means of a specially chosen pair of coding states.
The coding states are represented by density matrices
ρ0 (~n) = |0 : ~n〉 〈0 : ~n| = 12 Iˆ − 12~n · ~σ,
ρ1 (~n) = |1 : ~n〉 〈1 : ~n| = 12 Iˆ + 12~n · ~σ,
~n2 = 1, (1)
or by the eigenvectors |0 : ~n〉, |1 : ~n〉 of those. The set of those pairs is equivalent
to the set of the diameters of Poincare sphere.
It is supposed that the devices used by Alice can prepare the states (1) with
any given direction of the Bloch vector ~n, and the devices used by Bob make it
possible to detect the prepared states uniquely.
Mathematical representations of the measuring devices, Bob’s detectors, are
resolutions of identity
D (~m) = C0 (~m) + C1 (~m) , (2)
composed of pairs of projectors to orthogonal vectors
C0 (~m) = |0 : ~m〉 〈0 : ~m| ≡ ρ0 (~m) , C1 (~m) = |1 : ~m〉 〈1 : ~m| ≡ ρ1 (~m) . (3)
The detector reduces the state of the carrier ρ to the state represented by one
of eigenvectors of the projectors |0 : ~m〉 or |1 : ~m〉 and registers the number of
the projector as a value of the obtained bit. Probabilities of registration of the
bit value 0, P0 = Tr (C0 (~m) ρ), and the bit value 1, P1 = Tr (C1 (~m) ρ), are
complementary P0 + P1 = 1.
2.2 Coding
Alice sends data in packages that contain fixed numbers of Qubits. In each
package the numbers of the values 0 and the values 1 are the same, so amount
of information sent in one package is substantially smaller than the length of
the package. For a two-Qubit package there are only 2 possible values: B2 =
{01, 10}, so such a package can carry 1 bit. A package 4 Qubits in length can
have 6 different values B4 = {0011, 0101, 0110, 1001, 1010, 1100}. In the case of
4 values for two-Qubit coding there remain two values for transfer of overhead
information. A package 6 Qubits in length has 20 different values, 16 of those
can be used for four-bit coding, and 4 values remain for transfer of overhead
information.
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An important consequence of balance of packages is the fact that the average
by package density matrix ρb is a multiple of a unit matrix:
ρb =
K0
K
|0 : ~n〉 〈0 : ~n|+ K0
K
|1 : ~n〉 〈1 : ~n| = 1
2
Iˆ . (4)
This matrix does not carry information on the pair of states used for coding.
Deviations of the average density matrix of any message from the unit matrix
can not be longer than the length of the package, thus in an arbitrary fragment
of the message 10 packages in length deviations of density matrix from the
equilibrium one do not exceed 10%.
2.3 Control of validity
Bob’s detectors perform nondemolition measurements and reconstruct trans-
ferred data exactly. Inaccuracy in detector tuning leads to reconstruction errors
that can not be distinguished from the errors caused by nonauthorized interven-
tion in the process of data transfer. Control of validity of information transfer
is realized by means of feedback.
Having received each package, Bob sends its value back to Alice. Alice
compares this value to the sent one, and in the case of discrepancy sends a
package signaling of error, with sending the correct value once again. If there is
no error, Alice sends the next package. If Bob receives an unbalanced package,
he sends Alice a package signaling of error.
Intervention in the communication process usually leads to errors. Control
of validity of data transfer by means of feedback prevents following data transfer
and makes it possible to reveal increase of probability of error caused by such
intervention.
2.4 Prevention of eavesdropping by nondemolition mea-
surements
Alice and Bob routinely and in coordination change the coding basis and the
decoding detector. The set of bases of a Qubit is equivalent to the set of points
of a sphere. There exist infinite sequences of unique bases. Detector that
performs nondemolition measurements in one of those bases is incompatible
with detectors that perform nondemolition measurements in other bases. Eve’s
measurements that do not demolish the states of the data carrier when Alice
uses one of the bases reduce the states of the carrier in all the other bases, thus
Eve’s intervention is detected in the process of verification.
Having in mind that the algorithm of change of coding basis is known to
Eve, Alice and Bob use in this algorithm a random parameter which only they
know. This is, for instance, the number of packages sent after one error and till
the next one. The values of the parameter are collected by Alice and Bob and
are used at calculation of new basis only when the statistics of error collection
makes it possible for Alice and Bob to detect absence of intervention by Eve.
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An example of the algorithm of generation of the sequence of coding bases is
the algorithm of random walk on sphere. Each next point ~nk+1 that represents
the coding basis belongs to the great circle of Poincare sphere normal to the
great circle connecting the current point ~nk and the previous one ~nk−1, thus the
trajectory of the end of the Bloch vector turns at right angle. Direction of turn
is determined by the next bit of the random value, and the distance α = 3/4
from the current point to the new one is chosen as transcendent part 3/8π of
circumference of the great circle. Finite number of transcendent steps can not
return a point on sphere to initial position, thus all coding bases are different.
3 Measurement of quantum states
One of the participants of communication (Alice) prepares the states of informa-
tion carrier in quantum channel, and the other two participants, the authorized
participant Bob and the non-authorized one, Eve, perform measurements of
prepared states.
Measurement of a quantum state in general case is indirect, it requires mea-
surements of several, in the case of Qubit three incompatible observables [3].
The results of measurements of observables represented by Pauli matrices are
the Bloch vector components
ρ =
1
2
Iˆ +
1
2
~r · ~σ 7→ 〈~σ〉 = ~r 7→ ρmess = 1
2
Iˆ +
1
2
〈~σ〉 · ~σ. (5)
The results of measurements of each Pauli matrix are random values. The set
of values consists of two elements {−1, 1}. In the series with small lengths the
value of statistical dispersion is comparable to the average value, to increase
accuracy repetitive measurements of each observable are needed. Number of
repetitions K (s) (this value is named complexity of measurement [5]), required
for error not exceeding permissible limit s, is inversely proportional to the square
of this limit, K (s) = 1/s2.
3.1 Process of measurement
In the process of measurement of a quantum state Alice produces a sequence of
states
SA = {|s1, ~n1〉 〈s1, ~n1| , . . . , |sk, ~nk〉 〈sk, ~nk| , . . .} . (6)
Each state of this sequence is characterized by density matrix |sk, ~nk〉 〈sk, ~nk|
corresponding to the element of chosen coding basis ~nk with bit value sk.
In the k-th measurement either Bob, or Eve, uses the detector (2), D (~mk),
in which the projectors are characterized by some Bloch vector ~mk. The result
of the k-th measurement is the bit value 0 (corresponds to the registered value
of observable -1) or 1 (corresponds to the registered value of observable +1).
Probability of bit value r is determined as usually
Pr:k = Tr (Cr (~mk) |sk, ~nk〉 〈sk, ~nk|) (7)
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and can be written as a function of scalar product of Bloch vectors of the
detector ~mk and the prepared state ~nk
Pr:k =
1
2
(1 + (2sk − 1) (2r − 1) ~mk · ~nk) . (8)
In the process of measurement free choice is present two times: first, in each
measurement Alice (state sender) chooses orientation of the Bloch vector of pre-
pared state ~nk and the bit value sk; second, Bob or Eve, who register the state,
choose orientation of the Bloch vector of detector ~mk. This freedom of choice
can be used to achieve given purposes. So, Alice’s free choice of current values
of the bit sk is aimed to transfer of given information, and the free choice of
the Bloch vector ~nk of the prepared state can be used to prevent eavesdropping.
Bob’s free choice of the detector Bloch vector is aimed to reproduction of infor-
mation sent by Alice, and the Eve’s free choice of the detector Bloch vector is
aimed to reproduction of this information as well.
3.1.1 Nondemolition measurement
Let the choice of orientation of the Bloch vector of the detector ~mk coincides with
the choice of orientation of the Bloch vector of the prepared state ~nk, ~mk = ~nk,
this is specific for the authorized recipient Bob. The detector performs non-
demolition measurements (nondemolition detector), probability of registration
of a bit value is equal to one if this value is the same to the value of the bit
of prepared state, or to zero in opposite case. Thus the detector registers a
sequence of bits SB = {b1 = s1, , . . . , bk = sk, . . .} reproducing the sequence of
the source bits (6).
The results of measurements by the nondemolition detector separately can
not prove or disprove coincidence of the Bloch vectors of the detector ~mk and the
prepared state ~nk. Verification of Bob’s measurements is performed by means
of feedback, Eve can not verify her measurements.
3.1.2 Determination of coding basis by Bob
The problem of determination of coding basis is to be solved by Bob before
communication session starts, and is the main part of the step of communication
channel tuning.
Alice prepares a sequence 3K of same states |1, ~n〉 〈1, ~n|. Bob’s task is to de-
termine the Bloch vector orientation. As an example let us suppose that in the
Bob’s basis Bloch vector of the states prepared by Alice is ~n =
(
1/2, 1/2, 1/
√
2
)
.
In the first K measurements Bob uses a detector represented by Bloch vector
~e1 = (1, 0, 0), in the following K measurements a detector represented by Bloch
vector ~e2 = (0, 1, 0), and in the last K measurements a detector represented by
Bloch vector ~e3 = (0, 0, 1). The expected average values of the statistical sam-
ples obtained by Bob are equal to the components of the Bloch vector ~n, and
the mean square deviations are determined by variance of Pauli matrices Vσ = 1
and the lengths of the samples for each observable, and are equal to 1/
√
K − 1.
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If samples with lengths K = 401 are used, this provides 10% accuracy in estima-
tion of the Bloch vector components ~nev = (0.5± 0.05, 0.5± 0.05, 0.71± 0.05);
to decrease the error two times, the lengths of the samples are to be increased
4 times.
3.1.3 Determination of coding basis by Eve
The Eve’s task differs from the Bob’s task by the fact that Alice does not repeat
same states for her. Let us consider as an example a sequence of states with
length 3K where Alice alternates between two states |0, ~n〉 〈0, ~n| and |1, ~n〉 〈1, ~n|
of one basis with Bloch vector ~n =
(
1/2, 1/2, 1/
√
2
)
. From this sequence Eve
can draw three subsequences interlaced in arbitrary order, though not being
supported by Alice she can not know if those subsequences are same or not.
Let νx is a part of states |1, ~n〉 〈1, ~n| with bit 1 in the subsequence in which
Eve measures the Pauli matrix σx. The expected average values of the Pauli
matrices are equal
〈σk〉 = nk (2νk − 1) 7→ 〈σ1,2〉 = ν1,2 − 1/2, 〈σ3〉 =
√
2 (ν3 − 1/2) . (9)
Coding basis (1) is calculated by means of substitution of those values to the
formulas (5).
The error for each average value s = 1/
√
K − 1 is determined by the length
of the sequence used by Eve for determination of coding basis, and it slowly
decreases with increase of length. Till the average value is below the error, the
measurements do not make it possible to calculate the coding basis.
The subsequences in which the part of states with bit 1 is equal to 1/2,
or differs from this value not more than by value of error 1/
√
K − 1, are the
most promising in prevention of eavesdropping. Estimation of the Bloch vector
components obtained by Eve as the result of measurements is equal to zero up
to the error, thus Eve can not calculate the direction of the Bloch vector, and
the problem on determination of the coding basis is unsolvable.
4 Eavesdropping
Since the first publications on the quantum key distribution protocols of quan-
tum cryptography, a set of the most hazardous methods of possible eavesdrop-
ping is defined. Eavesdropping with nondemolition measurements and eaves-
dropping with intercept-resend attack are among those.
The second method is in reality not very hazardous since absorption of the
signal and its emission by Eve’s devices need time not smaller than duration
of the information carrying pulse. Pulse duration is restricted from beneath
with uncertainty relation “time-energy” and can be measured. Control of the
time of pulse propagation performed through open communication channels
independent from the secured one makes it possible to reveal the intercept-
resend attack.
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The method of eavesdropping with nondemolition measurements is the most
hazardous for the direct communication quantum channels. The main disad-
vantage of the method is in absence of possibility of verification of eavesdropped
information. Eve, in spite of Bob, can not ask Alice to confirm validity, and for
calculation of the coding basis can rely on the direct methods of measurement of
carrier states only. Those methods are considered in the subsection 3.1.3 where
it is shown that application of balanced blocks of information transfer with same
frequencies of repetition of coding states prevents calculation of coding basis.
In reality Eve can occasionally guess the coding basis and recognize reliability
of data by means of evaluation of meaningfulness of eavesdropped information.
In the proposed protocol such a method of eavesdropping is prevented by routine
change of coding basis by means of random choice of a new basis. Let us
suppose that Eve knows the algorithm of calculation of the position of new
basis on Poincare sphere. The algorithm includes application of a random bit
that determines the direction of turn of the basis. The required bit sequence
can be formed long before its application. Probability of correct selection of
direction by Eva at one step of change of the basis is 1/2, and at 8 steps it
becomes less than 0.01. One can suppose that occasionally Eve can intercept
information contained in 8 sequential blocks. Along with that, with probability
exceeding 0.99, in one of 8 sequential blocks Eve fails in choosing direction of
Bloch vector, this leads to substantial distortions as the result of reduction of
carrier states and forces Alice and Bob to terminate communication.
5 Conclusions
Peculiarities of measurement of quantum states make is possible to develop the
direct communication quantum channels preventing eavesdropping.
The authorized recipient Bob can verify received data by means of feedback,
and thus co-ordinate his choice of detection basis with the choice of the coding
basis by Alice. Reliable methods of verification of eavesdropped data by the
non-authorized recipient Eve without support from Alice are absent at all. To
determine the coding basis, Eve has to perform regular measurements reducing
the carrier states, and this leads to rapid growth of the error.
Bob’s verification of received data by means of feedback makes it possible
to detect this increase of error caused by Eve’s intervention. Eavesdropping
by means of nondemolition measurements, not detected through verification, is
prevented by balanced data coding and routine change of the coding basis.
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